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Code of Ethics Revisited
by Professor William I. Weston

Over two years ago, I filled these pages
with an analysis of the newly-approved
Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
Maryland which had been adopted in
April of 1986 by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland. (17.1 U. Balt. L. Forum 31
(1986)). Although disciplinary actions
involving the Model Rules have only
recently begun to appear in the Advance
Sheets, the application of the Model Rules
to the everyday practice of law has already
been felt. Despite the absence of court
decisions, lawyers are determining the
parameters of their conduct by the Model
Rules. Another look at some of the Rules,
therefore, may be of value.
The first provision which has impacted
upon the practitioner with significant
force is Rule 1.5 dealing with fees.
Although the language waffles a bit, the
intent is to place on the individual attorney the burden of implementing a fair and
reasonable system of charging fees which
he must communicate to the client in such
a way that the client comprehends and
agrees to the system. Although Rule 1.5
draws a dichotomy between the new client
and the former client, the burden is the
same. At a minimum, whether the client is
an existing one or a new one, the lawyer
should present a written document which
spells out the method by which the fee will
be charged, the time frame during which
the fee is to be charged, the services which
are included and excluded, and the obligation(s) as to costs and monies due at the
outset. It is shortsighted for a lawyer today
to deal with any client without a written
fee document.
An additional concern, also found 10

Rule 1.5, is whether the lawyer may consider the results of his representation of the
client in setting his or her fees, (hereinafter
referred to as "result orientation").
Increasingly, lawyers for both defendants
and plaintiffs are abandoning the traditional approach of the hourly rate in favor
of a combination of hourly rate and result
orientation. The consideration of results
obtained in setting a fee is permitted by the
Model Rules - as long as the total fee is
reasonable. Although there are some situations in which result orientation rewards
competence and hard work above and
beyond the ordinary, there is legitimate
concern that result orientation will
become the normal and accepted way of
setting fees. Moreover, the use of result
orientation in setting a fee brings into
clash the words of the Model Rules and the
concepts of professionalism. The danger in
such an approach is that result orientation
gives the lawyer a piece of the action.
Instead of maintaining an objective and
detached view of the case, the lawyer
becomes an interested party, protecting his
or her own interests as much as that of the
client. The lawyer must serve as the facilitator of the entrusted legal matter and not
as the dealer in a card game.
The incentive to achieve a good result
should exist irrespective of the financial
gain; and, if there is any extraordinary
gain, it should benefit the client. Rule 1.5
says the lawyer is entitled to a reasonable
fee for his or her efforts. There is nothing
wrong with a lawyer being paid a reasonable bonus for an extraordinary achievement. The major beneficiary of a positive
result, however, should remain the client.

Fees charged and collected under Model
Rule 1.5 for the referral of a client continue to be a serious concern to lawyers and
to the Bar. Pennsylvania and Texas have
modified their version of the Model Rules
to permit charging and collecting a referral
fee. Maryland does not permit collection'
of referral fees. The rule prohibiting referral fees comes from a combination of the
rules governing reasonable fees and lawyer
responsibility. A lawyer who is not
responsible for the case or who has not
shared in the work involved in the case is
not entitled to share in the fee collected.
To do so would render the fee unreasonable. For example, if the second lawyer may
pay the first lawyer up to one-third of the
fee collected only for the act of referring
the case, without any work or responsibility, then the fee being charged the client is
too high - probably one-third too high.
According to the Supreme Court, lawyering is in the free flow of commercial information (Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977)); however, nothing in the
Supreme Court opinion(s) suggest that
professionalism and the placing of the
client ahead of the greed of the attorney
are inconsistent with commercial activities
by an attorney.
The second provision of the Model
Rules which is troublesome is Maryland's
version of Model Rule 1.6. Specifically,
section 1.6 (b)(1) and (2) provide that a
lawyer "may" reveal information which
the lawyer believes necessary to prevent
the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer believes will
result in death, substantial bodily harm, or
substantial injury to the financial interests
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or property of another. ("Information" is
the new term of art replacing "confidences" and "secrets" in the old Model
Code). Subsection (2) allows the lawyer to
reveal information to rectify the consequences of the client's criminal or fraudulent act.
While the goal of revealing information
to avoid bodily harm or economic harm is
noble, the vehicle chosen is incorrect. The
terms are ill-defined and unclear. What, for
example, is a fraudulant act? Is the act
violative of criminal fraud, civil fraud, or
some yet-to-be-defined notion of fraud?
What is "substantial injury to the financial
interests of property of another?" From
what perspective is that phrase drawn and,
if it is from the lawyer's perspective, how
does he or she have the information necessary to makt; a conclusion that "another"
is to undergo substantial injury to his or
her financial interest of property.

Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) was a case where it
was necessary to reveal information to
"another." There, a psychologist failed to
take sufficient steps to warn his patient's
girlfriend that the patient intended to kill
her. The fact that the psychologist contacted the campus police did not extricate him
from his responsibility to the third party.
In the case of possible death or bodily
harm, the decision to reveal information is
a bit easier to make and the stakes involved
do demand a balanced approach. When
considering economic harm, however, the
risks to the attorney are enormous.
For an attorney to believe that he may
break the most sacred of his fiduciary
duties, confidentiality, to avoid the occurrence of this type of economic injury constitutes a lack of understanding of the
nature of his duties. Only in the most compelling circumstances should an attorney
reveal information. Possible economic
harm can never be equated to serious bodily injury or death and, hence, should not
give an attorney ground for disclosure. In
addition, the attorney is placed in the position of making all of the judgment_ He
"may" reveal the information that he
"reasonably believes" is necessary to avoid
death or the economic harm which he "believes" will result. Upon reading the language in Rule 1.6, one understands why no
other state has chosen to adopt the strict
version of this rule.
Rule 1.6 is impossible to apply and to
enforce and it gives the attorney no guidance as to how to determine what he or
she may reveal. When faced with the alternatives of revealing information to prevent
serious economic harm and the potential
of a malpractice and/or grievance action,

the reasonable attorney will opt for
silence. Maryland does not recognize the
holding in Tarasoff, supra; see Shaw v.
Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625
(1980). Thus, the potential liability for failure to disclose is not present in Maryland.
It is well-intentioned for a lawyer to desire
to reveal conduct which would result in
serious economic harm, however, the
risks, burdens, and lack of guidance implicit in this section make the revealing of this
type of information impossible.
The third provision which has undergone further analysis since last year is Rule
7.1 relating to advertising. The most recent

"Only in the most
compelling
circumstances should
an attorney reveal
information"

case addressing this issue is Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Assoc., __ U.S. __, 108 S.
Ct. 1916 (1988) Although Shapero dealt
with targeted direct mail advertising, the
language of the decision moves away from
the Bar's attempt to limit advertising
beyond what is inherently misleading or
deceptive in fact. In Shapero, the attorney
had applied to the Attorney Advertising
Commission for permission to send a
letter to persons he believed had had
foreclosure suits filed against them. The
Commission did not find the letter to be
offensive, but did rule that a letter sent to
people in need of an attorney's services
was not constitutionally protected speech.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
the decision; but the United States
Supreme Court reversed. The Court
further ruled that the letters were not
overwhelming so as to put pressure on the
recipient and, in fact, no form of written
communication presents that type of
danger.
Although advertising will be subject to
review by the courts through the Attorney
Grievance Commission, the clear message
of the Court is that advertising is protected
commercial speech and regulation of it by
the states must be limited to those
situations where the advertising 1S

misleading or deceptive. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. McCloskey, 306 Md.
677, 511 A.2d 56 (1987) required that proof
of misleading evidence must be clear and
convincing and that someone has actually
been misled.
The purpose of advertising is to bring to
the public's attention the availability of
legal services and to make them aware of
legal rights which may be afforded to
them. There is, therefore, an important
public component to advertising which
cannot be lightly dismissed. That public
component, coupled with constitutional
guarantees regarding commercial speech,
render proscriptions regarding advertising
by the Maryland Bar or any bar very
limited. Moreover, of the types of
advertising which are least intrusive and
hence subject to less scrutiny, newspaper
advertising will receive greater protection
than will television advertising.
Many lawyers object to advertising on
the grounds of dignity, professionalism,
and the actual content of the
advertisement. The concept of advertising
does not mean that all advertisements are
palatable to all people. Like most other
types of protected speech, however, the
right of the speaker overcomes issues of
dignity and professionalism. Zauderer v.

O/Jue of Disciplinary Counsel of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626
(1985). Perhaps it is time for the Bar to
retreat from its efforts to draw a bright
line regarding advertising and to
commence affirmative acts to encourage
quality, competent, and clear advertising
which is clearly within the spirit and letter
of Model Rules 7.1-7.3.
The fourth provision of increasing
concern today is Rule 3.1 and its
application concerning frivolous claims.
This rule is the successor to Disciplinary
Rule 7-102 (A)(l) of the old Code. Model
Rule 1.3 approaches the issue of frivolous
claims from the perspective of good faith
by stating that the lawyer should not move
forward on a case absent the existence of a
good faith argument in support of the
client's position. This is a significant
improvement over the predecessor
Disciplinary Rule which defined the issue
of frivolous claims by the "purpose behind
the litigation." The purpose could not be
to harass or injure another. The prior
Model Code reviewed frivolous claims
from the perspective of the attorney ("if
the lawyer knows or it is obvious"), rather
than the more sound approach (an
objective standard) taken by the Model
Rules.
Rule 3.1 has not been the subject of
litigation. In light of the increasing
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application of Maryland Rule 1-341, however, which "punishes" attorneys for
bringing a case without substantial justification, the wisdom of the need for both
rules is in question. Rule 1-341 gives to the
trial judge broad powers to determine,
after the fact, whether the case is "frivolous." The increasing misapplication of
the rule by judges on their own motion,
however, is problematic. In addition, the
application of this rule obligates the "offending attorney" to expend considerable
time and expense fighting the allegation(s)
and often having to appeal them. All of
this is conducted without the protections
afforded by the Attorney Grievance Commission and Rule 3.1.
It is without question that there are frivolous cases and attorneys who bring matters without substantial justification.
Model Rule 3.1, however, provides more
than adequate protection to the court and
the legal system in a controlled setting,
guaranteeing constitutionally protected
liberties. There are dangers if the same
judge who is hearing or has heard the case

also is assigned to determine if the case was
"frivolous." Moreover, that judge makes
his or her decision without the opportunity of cool reflection and detachment as
provided by the Commission. No one benefits from the continuing and broad
application of Rule 1-341 in lieu of the
existing Model Rule.
The final provision concerning ethical
conduct facing lawyers today is the
application of Model Rule 6.1 concerning
pro bono service. Without belaboring an
already well-covered topic, the language of
the Rule already provides a vehicle for
public service. Two things are needed for
better successes in this area: first, increasing public awareness of what is already
provided by attorneys and, second, a lawyer awareness program to increase the
delivery of pro bono services. The reality
is that most lawyers already provide some
type of pro bono legal services. These services could be done by not billing a client,
or by accepting cases from legal services
agencies. Attempts to expand the language
and meaning of Rule 6.1 will not alter the

current commitment of attorneys to the
delivery of legal services.
The extent and application of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct will be realized to a greater degree over the coming
year as the Court of Appeals of Maryland
is called upon to interpret specific language. The Model Rules do address many
of the linguistic problems that its predecessors had. This is significant. What is needed now are cautious, detached reviews of
the provisions which are being applied to
specific cases so that the modifications
which occur to the plain meaning of the
written words do not result in a document
substantially different from that originally
approved.
Professor William I. Weston is a faculty
member at the University of Baltimore
School of Law. He is a member of the
Maryland and D.C Bars. Prior to joining
the faculty he served as Bar Grievance
Administrative and Executive Director of
the Bar Association of Baltimore City.
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